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Built to celebrate two crucial events in the history of the Islamic Republic, that is the 1979 
revolution and the subsequent Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), Tehran’s Museum of the Holy 
Defence (muze defa'-e moghaddas) is a prism through which one can peruse the official 
narrative about the source of legitimacy of the current regime. The museum promotes a specific 
historical interpretation revolving around Islam as the pivot of both the revolution and the war. 
Islam was the source of inspiration for revolutionaries as well as the ideal that the soldiers and 
front volunteers defended during the war. It represents the central element of this official 
narrative—which obviously, is one of the narratives present in society, yet it is ubiquitous and 
predominant. Likewise, the political landscape in the country is narrowly constructed around 
loyalty to Islam and the principle of the velayat-e faqih. While the constitution of the Islamic 
Republic recognises both divine and popular sovereignty, the principle of the velayat-e faqih 
(or the guardianship/leadership of the jurist) locates ultimate sovereignty into the hands of the 
vali-e faqih (the jurist), considered to be almost infallible because guided by God and 
knowledge of the Islamic law and philosophy (Ghobadzadeh, 2014). This principle gives to the 
faqih special powers in terms of supervision and intervention if mundane politics derails from 
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the right path inspired by religion. In Iran, every legal political organisation is obliged to state 
its loyalty to the vali-e faqih, or the leader (rahbar), and must act in accordance with the 
principle. Additionally, yet needless to say, all permitted political organisations must be 
Islamic, in the sense of stating their allegiance to the Islamic religion and, consequently, the 
constitution.  
In such a narrow political and discursive space, in which religion represents the common 
obligatory reference for all political forces, is Islam still a criterion for differentiating amongst 
active political organisations? This chapter argues that, in spite of the limited discursive liberty 
available to organised political forces, diverging interpretations of Islam do represent a 
criterion along which differentiation takes place and popular consensus coalesces. Obviously, 
popular political orientations transcend the limitation of Islam: secular preferences, whether 
leftist, liberal or conservatives, are present among the population, but do not find representation 
in the political system because of said constitutional constraints. 
This chapter investigates how Islam constitutes an obligatory universal reference and an 
element of distinction at the same time. In fact, despite restrictions, political competition over 
elections and the distribution of resources is real (Alem, 2016). But, ‘where’ does such 
competition take place? What shape does organised politics have in Iran? How have Islam and 
the structuration of political competition in political parties/factions interacted? While parties 
do not exist as such, political preferences and interests regroup within factions. Instead of a 
derogatory term, faction (faksiun) indicates the coming together of like-minded individuals 
who share similar interests and mobilise to acquire elected positions as well as to orientate the 
policy-making process through a variety of means, ranging from alliance building to 
influencing public opinion.  
Building on the scholarship examining the relationship between religion and politics, this 
chapter analyses the formation of a factional system pivoted around—among other things—
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different interpretations of Islam, and proposes an investigation of the latter. More specifically, 
the chapter first examines Iran’s ‘political market’ and its evolution: the field where political 
competition takes place and the historical trajectories that have contributed to its current 
structure. Secondly, the chapter discusses the ideological differences between the competing 
factions. Two variations are proposed: reformist or liberal Islam and anti-liberal Islam. These 
two ideal-types aim to capture the differences both in terms of values and factional interests 
that they embody. The chapter argues, in fact, that while discursive and ideological differences 
matter, competition amongst factions also has a material dimension informed by interests and 
class politics. The chapter does not conceive of the ideational and material elements as separate, 
and aims to grasp and examine both. 
 
 
Religion and political organisations: Preliminary observations 
 
The scholarship on the relationship between religion and political parties—or political 
organisations and politics, more broadly—is vast and has preoccupied scholars for sometimes. 
The Iranian revolution of 1979 opened the door to such reflections: during a time when 
modernisation theory and its ramifications were still the dominant lenses for sociological and 
political analysis, the Iranian revolution showed that religion was not wiped away by the force 
of authoritarian secularisation (Keddie, 1997). Likewise, the rise of the Christian Right in the 
United States concomitant with the coming to power of the Republicans and the end of the 
‘Golden age’ powerfully stated that the ideological traction of religion in politics was far from 
being relegated to Muslim-majority populations (Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2014). The rise of 
political Islam across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), in the meanwhile, suggested 
that a radical revision of dominant approaches to the study of politics was needed. As Volpi 
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and Stein (2015) explained, Islamism was hardly considered as a salient variable. The 
scholarship regularly proposed analysis pivoted around modernisation and class theory, and 
regularly dismissed Islamism as an obsolete anomaly.  
 
The religious revival that occurred widely after the collapse of the Soviet Union forced scholars 
to re-consider extant approaches. In particular, the analysis of political parties and how they 
navigate the religious sentiment, how they instrumentalise it for electoral purposes and how 
parties are ‘taken over’ by religious constituencies has become central. As Payam Mohseni and 
Clyde Wilcox (2008) discuss, religion is a notion with multi-dimensional articulations, being 
at the same time an ideology, an institution, and a host of material and ideational resources for 
political organisations. Likewise, political parties can be equally difficult to define and analyse. 
While, at times, they have a clear structure and a defined political programme, at other times 
parties are poorly structured and their boundaries may be unstable, shifting, and vary according 
to circumstances. As electoral laws change, in fact, parties may dissolve and then regroup under 
different names, with a larger or smaller, more or less religious membership (Bartolini et al., 
2004).  
It follows that the relationship between religion and parties may be difficult to examine as a 
stable and roundly-defined correlation. Parties may not be either secular or religious: they may 
need to ‘hide’ their religious preferences or, on the contrary, ‘enrich’ their secular nature with 
religious references under the pressure of institutional conditions or the public opinion. In the 
case of Turkey, for instance, Islamist parties such as the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
need to pledge allegiance to the laicité of the Turkish constitution and navigate a narrow space 
for implementing religiously-inspired policies that ‘moralise’ Turkish society (Yılmaz, 2015). 
On the other hand, Anne Wolf (2018) discusses how Nida al-Tunis, the secular party of Tunisia, 
still makes regular references to Islam and religion as a ‘moral compass’ for their policy choice, 
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to the point that she talks about ‘secular forms of politicised Islam’. Likewise, Hendrik 
Kraetzschmar and Alam Saleh (2018) challenge the ‘secular vs Islamist’ polarisation in 
Egyptian party politics, showing how the ‘polarisation as it takes place at the discursive level 
is not necessarily a sanguine reflection of the factual ideological/policy distances extant 
between political parties’ (p. 222), but reflects the need to offer an alternative political 
discourse to voters. In the last decade, Italian political parties have increasingly relied on 
religious symbolism to gain the voters’ support, in the belief that resorting to traditions was a 
winning electoral strategy (Giorgi, 2013). Ideological shifts informed by environmental 
conditions and time are also present when it comes to the democratic preferences of religiously-
inspired parties: while scholars of Islamist politics debate whether Islamism is compatible with 
democracy or not, it is often forgotten that in the past Catholic political parties have often 
helped authoritarian political movements to achieve power—while their democratic 
commitment is today unquestioned (Conway, 2008). Finally, another important dimension of 
the analysis of the parties-religion relationship is the presence of non-state, non-party, agents 
that intervene in such a relationship. Sometimes, in fact, religious bodies and associations 
interfere and put pressure on political parties by raising ethical issues and by injecting (or 
withdrawing) material resources into the ‘political marketplace’ of a country (Giorgi and 
Polizzi, 2015).  
It follows that, while religion is undoubtedly fundamental in structuring the party system and 
single parties’ policy choice and orientations, the way in which religion plays such a role 
depends on a larger configuration, and is informed by a multiplicity of factors. As Mohseni 
and Wilcox (2008) state, the relation between religion and political parties is complex because 
of the many ways in which religion can be examined—doctrinally, institutionally and 
socially—and the diverse articulations that such a relationship can have. In order to navigate 
such complexity, the two authors propose an analytical framework composed of six 
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dimensions: regime type, the political/religious marketplace, religious institutional structure 
(hierarchical or less so), the associational nexus, the nature of party system, and the parties and 
religious groups’ stance toward the state. The analysis proposed in this chapter utilises this 
framework in order to examine how the political system in Iran structured and how Islam has 
intervened in this process—after which the chapter moves on to assess how is Islam a criterion 
for differentiation amongst factions. 
 
 
The institutional context 
 
Regime type and opportunities for party formation  
 
Daniel Brumberg and Farideh Farhi (2016) distinguish the Islamic Republic from ‘full 
autocracies, which tolerate no uncertainty’, and define it as a ‘diffused-power semi-autocracy’ 
in which ‘power and authority [are] unevenly spread and concentrated among formal and 
informal mechanisms and arenas’ (p. 8). Brumberg and Farhi stress the role of fluid and 
informal dynamics by which ‘factions, cliques, and networks jockey for influence […] while 
collaborating to deflect challenges coming from outside the ruling elite or family’ (Ibidem, p. 
8). Alternatively labelled as an ‘hybrid regimes’ or ‘electoral authoritarianism’ 
(Abdolmohammadi and Cama, 2015), the Islamic Republic is considered to be  able to survive 
instability thanks to its flexibility and accommodating capacity (Keshavarzian, 2005). In such 
a system,  
 
fluid institutional and legal mechanisms create a hobbled or ‘feckless’ pluralism 
(to use Tom Carother’s evocative term), one that seems to be incoherent, 
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disorganized, and constantly improvised but uses such suppleness to channel, 
contain, or diffuse challenges to regime domination and elite unity (Brumberg and 
Farhi, 2016, p. 8).  
 
‘Feckless’ pluralism articulates limited ideological diversity which translates into the presence 
of contrasting opinions voiced by different political organisations. How do political groups 
organise in Iran? The Iranian constitution allows for the formation of political parties.  More 
specifically, article 26 legalises the establishment of ‘parties, societies, political or professional 
associations, as well as religious societies, whether Islamic or pertaining to one of the 
recognized religious minorities’, unless they ‘violate the principles of independence, freedom, 
national unity, the criteria of Islam, or the basis of the Islamic Republic’.1 In the early days of 
the revolution, nearly a hundred political parties were established, including leftist and liberal, 
reflecting the ideological and political diversity of the revolutionary front. However, after a 
severe crackdown, the subsequent 1981 ‘Law Concerning the Activities of Parties, 
Associations, Political Associations and Guild Associations, Islamic Associations or the 
Associations of Recognized Religious Minorities’ was issued to strengthen the newly 
established regime’s control over political competition (Fairbanks, 1998). The 1981 law, in 
fact, introduced the need to get a permission to operate by the Ministry of Interior—a 
requirement that led to the ban of most of existing parties. The Islamic Republic Party (Hezb-
e Jomhouri-e Islami—IRP), dominated by Khomeini’s supporters who were also taking over 
the institutions of the new-born Islamic Republic, then became the only legal party in the 
country. 
While the IRP self-dissolved in 1987 originating a factional system, as discussed in the next 
section, attempts at promoting the establishment of political parties regained strength again in 
                                                        
1 Available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989.pdf?lang=en 
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the late 1990s. During the post-war period in fact, one of the ambitions of ruling governments 
was to modernise, normalise, and rationalise Iranian politics through the establishment of 
political parties. The necessity for more structured political regroupings was something that 
politicians and journalists voiced, lamenting the fact that existing factions lacked proper 
strategy and clarity about principles, ideas, and programmes (Razavi, 2009). Towards this end, 
the reformist administrations led by Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) established the House 
of parties (Khane-ye Hezb) in 2002, with the goal of promoting the formation of parties. The 
House offered services such as registration and provided rooms and offices for meetings. It had 
the ambition of becoming a hub and a meeting point for reformist parties, increasing 
interactions among them and promoting the formation of inter-organisational structures. In 
spite of such efforts and in spite of the significant number of registered parties, very few 
became proper organisations with an independent programme and a working structure. 
According to one functionary of the House, most of the registered organisations were local 
groups whose function was to mobilise the electorate in favour of other ‘parties’ when local or 
national elections approached.2 These ‘parties’ were built on extant networks of interest, 
clienteles and professional associations that followed the government’s invitation to register, 
but did not have an independent electoral or political programme. Some new parties, however, 
emerged as real political forces with a specific identity and demands such as, for instance, the 
reformist Iranian Islamic Participation Front (Jehb’eh Mosharekat-e Iran-e Islami—IIPF). 
According to Reza Razavi (2010), however, the parties established during this period faced a 
number of difficulties. Such constraints were: the hostility of the conservative front towards 
party politics; the existing legal restrictions, which did not allow political parties to function 
freely; internal structural problems, which determined a democratic deficit; and the fact that 
parties were formed from above, originating from the elite’s need for public visibility rather 
                                                        
2 Interview with author, June 2008, Tehran. 
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than from a genuine popular demand. Structural conditions were unfavourable to the 
emergence of political parties, and in fact most of these new reformist political formations 
disappeared by the early 2010s under the joint pressure of state repression (especially after the 
2009 crisis) and institutional marginalisation by mightier conservative bodies. 
 
From a one-party system to factions 
 
It is common understanding that factions run Iranian politics. Factions are loosely assembled 
groups that form along multiple lines of interests, ranging from shared economic interests to 
shared positions on cultural and social policies. Bahman Bakhtiari (1996) described Iran’s elite 
factional system with an analogy to the Italian system of correntocrazia, which identifies in 
correnti, similar to factions, the protagonist of Italian politics. In Italy, political parties 
represent the infrastructure upon which constitutional politics is based, but it is within correnti 
that decisions are made and interests align. In Iran, likewise, decisions are prepared and 
interests align within factions. As Bakhtiari (1993) explains, factions have been a major 
impediment to the centralization of power in revolutionary Iran. They are fluid and allow for 
multiple memberships. Factions rarely participate in elections as such. Rather, candidates’ lists 
are usually formed for electoral purposes and they may gather members from several factions. 
Historically, these conditions have strengthened elite fragmentation which, in turn, originated 
limited ideological pluralism (Keshavarzian, 2005). 
Conventional wisdom makes the emergence of elite factionalism coincide with the dissolution 
of the IRP, the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, and the death of Khomeini. During the first 
decade after the establishment of the Islamic Republic there was little or no opportunity for 
elite factionalism: the war was raging, a new system of institutions and power had to be 
routinised and, particularly between early and mid-1980s, Khomeinist forces united to side-
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line, when not physically eliminate, liberal and Marxist forces. The unity of pro-Khomeini 
forces was promoted through the IRP. However, as Maziar Behrooz (1991) discussed, political 
factionalism was rife during the 1980s and caused Khomeini’s frequent interventions in public 
affairs. While the elite was united within the framework of the IRP, a number of satellite 
associations existed and weakened such unity. In June 1987, Khomeini dissolved the IRP. 
Later, the absence of an equally charismatic leader to replace Khomeini with made it difficult 
to keep together the elite, leading to factionalism.   
The reasons why the IRP failed as an institution in the context of the routinisation of the Islamic 
Republic relate to increased factionalism on the one side, and to diffidence towards political 
parties as institutions on the other side. Political factionalism was boosted by the joint action 
of two phenomena, namely the presence of a range of contrasting opinions regarding economic 
policies and the failure of the IRP to develop into a mass party. These two elements led to the 
weakening of the IRP as a party structure, while diffidence played a fundamental role in 
destroying the party’s legitimacy. In particular, a vision that juxtaposed the clergy and the party 
as institutions developed, leading to the opinion that the possible creation of two centres of 
power was detrimental to the revolution. The presence of political parties was seen as 
threatening to the centrality of the rahbar. The clergy, then, was indicated as ‘the main guiding 
force for political activities in the country’ (Razavi, 2010, p. 85). Diffidence was also fomented 
by the idea that Khomeini’s original words and thought were enough to give political guidelines 
and instruction to the elite and population, without the mediation of structures such as political 
parties. Khomeini’s leadership was rooted in the notion of the oneness of society, which 
presented similarities with the Islamic concept of tohid (tawhid), that is the unicity of God. 
Ideally, this vision prefigured a stateless and classless society, which united around the words 
of a leader rather than a multi-layered governing system. 
Commented [JH1]: I don’t know this word. What does it 
mean, please? 
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The 1988 parliamentary election saw the formation of two competing groups: the Majma-e 
Rouhanniyoun-e Mobarez (Assembly of the combatant clerics—MRM) and the Jame-ye 
Rouhaniyat-e Mobarez (Association of the combatant clergy—JRM).3 MRM included leftist 
members of parliament and candidates, earning the name of ‘Islamic left’ for itself. It counted 
on the presence of anti-capitalist personalities such as Mohammad Mousavi-Khoeinha, but also 
future reformists who would later become sympathetic to free market policies and willing to 
strike alliances with members of the JRM, such as Mohammad Khatami, Mir-Hossein 
Moussavi, Mehdi Karroubi. The JRM, or ‘Islamic right’, included rightist conservative 
personalities, such as the Ayatollahs Ahmad Jannati, Mohamamd Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi and Ali 
Khamenei, Khomeini’s successor as rahbar. JMR also included ideologically flexible 
individuals, who will later ally with the reformists such as Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and 
Hassan Rouhani. The backbone of the Iranian factional system was in place. 
In 1989, Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected president replacing Khamenei, who replaced 
Khomeini as rahbar. The constitutional reform, approved in 1989, brought significant changes 
in the institutional make-up of the Islamic Republic: it increased the powers of the president of 
the Republic and, in parallel, those of the rahbar, who extended his powers of supervision and 
intervention in political disputes. The system was strengthened at the top at the expense of 
collegiality, and created a duality between the elected president and the unelected rahbar. The 
1989 constitutional reform also dropped the requirement for the rahbar to be a marja-e taqlid 
(a source of emulation, the title distinguishing the most learnt and knowledgeable among the 
clerics), allowing an academically weak candidate, such as Khamenei, to ascend to the 
leadership. The foreseeable opposition of part of the Shia clergy—which present a significant 
variety of political opinion internally—to this change was easily contained thanks to 
                                                        
3 The JRM formed before the revolution as a loose and general association of revolutionary clerics in Iran. After 
the revolution, while still existing as an informal association, converged into the IRP. 
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Khamenei’s increased constitutional powers. He supervised religious seminars and centres in 
Qom, the clerics’ sermons and writings, appointed every Friday prayers’ leader in the country, 
and controlled the Special Court for Clerics (Dadgah-e Vije-y Rouhaniyyat), which became an 
effective tool to curb criticism against the velayat-e faqih.4  
The strengthening of the powers of the rahbar and the president sparkled criticism amongst 
Islamic leftists, who demanded democratic inclusion. In addition, the shift toward a 
‘religionised politics’ (Ayubi, 2003)—epitomised by the politicisation of the role of the 
rahbar—generated discontent within the elite and the clergy. They feared that such a 
‘mundanisation’ was eventually detrimental to Islam, stripping it of all spirituality and pushing 
the people away from the sphere of the sacred towards secularism (Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, 
2006; Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2004). The emergence of these intra-elite conflicts was the 




Scholars have repeatedly tried to map out the Iranian factional system, regrouping factions 
according to their political and ideological inclinations. Payam Mohseni (2016) suggests that 
sympathy (or lack thereof) towards elected or unelected institutions is the main criterion 
shaping political factions’ ideological sensitivity of in the country. Mohseni identifies four sub-
divisions: the theocratic right and left, and the republican right and left—where ‘right’ and 
‘left’ are distinguished on the basis of their orientation towards the ‘social justice vs. the free 
market’ cleavage.  
                                                        
4 Apart from this, constitutionally, the vali-e faqih nominates: the head of the Judiciary system, of state TV and 
radio, has direct control over the defence forces (both the regular army and the IRGC— Islamic Revolution Guards 
Corps, or Sepah-e Pasdaran Enqelab-e Islami), nominates half of the members of the Guardian’s Council, 
influences the nomination of the Ministers of Intelligence and Interior, and plays a major role in the Supreme 
Council for the Cultural Revolution and National Security.  
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The theocratic right is supportive of conservative cultural policies and favours economic 
liberalism. Although historically related to the JRM, part of this factions moved towards more 
democratic views in the 1990s, giving birth to the republican right—a shift epitomised by 
figures such as the former president Hashemi Rafsanjani and the incumbent Hassan Rouhani. 
The republican right supports more progressive and liberal views in the field of social and 
cultural policies, along with neo-liberal policies in the economic field. The republican right 
represents the interests of the urban middle classes, professionals and entrepreneurs, and 
partially overlaps with the representatives of the reformist faction, who Mohseni originally 
located in the republican left. As Mohammad Maljoo (2017) points out, economic interests 
may overlap even if ideological preferences diverge. Examining the casualization of the Iranian 
labour market since mid-1990s, Maljoo discusses how members of both the right and the left, 
who later joined the ranks of the reformists (eslahtalaban), supported the deregulation of job 
hiring and termination. In the 1990s in fact, many Islamic leftists became owners of work 
placement agencies, thus benefitting from the presence of a growing mass of precarious 
workers. The republican and theocratic right, as well as the reformists, support the integration 
of Iran into global markets, but differ in their approach to the West as a cultural and political 
entity: eslahtalaban favour respectful cultural, religious and academic exchanges, while 
rightist factions are generally suspicious of such interactions. Their fear of cultural penetration, 
however, never clashed with the preference for an ‘open door’ policy in the economic realm. 
It also reflects the fact that many members of the Islamic right come from entrepreneurial 
families. 
On the opposite side, we have the theocratic and republican left. The theocratic left favours 
state intervention in the economy and holds strong anti-imperialist views. Attention for issues 
such as poverty and social justice is often coupled with emphasis on piousness and personal 
piety. The republican left had quasi-socialist economic views originally, but this changed with 
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the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the decline of the left’s popularity. Ideologically, it turned to 
reformism and liberalism in the late 1990s, adopting optimistic views on issues such as the 
compatibility of Islam with civil and political rights and favouring a democratic reform of the 
law. The republican left argued for the need to soften the system’s ideological rigidity, 
becoming tolerant of political diversity, personal preferences and life styles, and supporting 




The pluralisation of factions was accompanied by various interpretations of Islam. More 
specifically, while factions cannot transcend the limitation of holding Islam as their central and 
essential ideological reference, along with loyalty to the velayat-e faqih, what became plural 
was the interpretation of Islam that factions can hold. The diversity of interpretations revolves 
around issues such as whether Islam is more or less favourable to human rights, and whether 
Islam approves of women’s rights. This section examines the factions’ discourse. It identifies 
two different interpretations of Islam as a way to represent the diversity of the approaches to 
religion that elites hold. These two ideal-types have emerged in specific contexts, when 
environmental conditions pushed factions to adopt a different Islamic discourse in order to 
distinguish themselves. The two discourses are: reformist or liberal Islam and anti-liberal 
Islam. While a number of variations exist in the middle, these two ideal-types present the widest 
differences and are therefore considered here for analytical purposes.  
 
Reformist or liberal Islam 
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Muslim reformers, in Iran and elsewhere, emerged in the 1990s after previous generations in 
the 1970s and 1980s had worked for translating into practice the slogan ‘Islam is the solution’. 
They believed that the promises of political Islam had remained unfulfilled considering that 
poverty, corruption, and state inefficiency were still present despite Islamist revolutions and 
political commitment. Muslim reformers deduced, then, that these problems did not originate 
from the failure of religious morality to penetrate the state and society. Instead, they held 
authoritarian politics as accountable, emphasising the need for a legal framework to enforce 
the rulers’ accountability, the respect for human rights, and the right to dissent (Esposito, 1997; 
Browers, 2006). At the same time, the collapse of the bipolar world order freed up the space 
for Islamic reformers and democratic leaders to have international legitimacy. A few years 
later, in 2001, the attack on the Twin Towers and growing global Islamophobia pushed 
Muslims and Islamists towards a discourse of moderation, with the goal of distancing 
themselves from radicalism. Between the late 1990s and the 2000s, the word ‘reform’ (eslah) 
had become one of the leitmotivs in the speeches of leaders across the Muslim world. 
Intellectuals such as Abdolkarim Soroush, Dalil Boubakeur, Abdou Filali-Ansary, Fatima 
Mernissi, Bassam Tibi, Soheib Bencheikh, and Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim argued in favour 
of a liberal, democratic and, in their words, modern re-interpretation of Islam and Sharia to 
make them compatible with modern-day values and norms such as democracy and human 
rights. Referred to variously as reformist, modern, protestant, positive, enlightened, liberal 
Islam emerged when ‘insistent calls’ for ‘reform and liberalization’ came both from within and 
outside of Muslim communities (Filali-Ansary 2003).  
In Iran, reformist or liberal Islam emerged both as an echo of such transnational debates and as 
a localised phenomenon, rooted in the idea that the 1979 revolution was somehow un-finished. 
In fact, the revolution failed to deliver the promise of democratic rule. This idea was dominant 
amongst leftist intellectuals and politicians, who were experiencing an ideological 
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transformation into democratic reformists. Hamid Reza Jalaeipour (2006), a university 
professor of sociology and a member of the reformist IIPF, described the Islamic Republic as 
a system navigating a ‘crisis of achievement’. The notion of a ‘betrayed’ revolution is crucial 
in the thought of other intellectuals, too. A towering figure in the history of the Islamic 
Republic, as well as in the field of religious philosophy and hermeneutics, Ayatollah Ali 
Montazeri has criticised the isolation in which the Islamic Republic plunged after the 
revolution, the violence of revolutionary slogans, and the restrictions to civil and political 
freedoms—factors that, according to him, endanger Islam, the nation, and the foundations of 
the revolution. He insisted that unity, freedom, and the efforts of create an open society should 
be the guiding principles of contemporary politics. Montazeri also argued that the ultimate goal 
of the velayat-e faqih is to keep alive the republican character of the system by encouraging 
the people’s political participation.  
The philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush is perhaps the most famous Iranian public intellectual. 
He criticised the crystallisation of Islam into a codified and immutable system of laws. In his 
view, religious interpretation needs to be dynamic (fiq-e puya) to allow the law and customs of 
Iranian society to adapt to modernity. Soroush suggested the idea that a-historical 
interpretations of Islam would have led to the social marginalisation of religion. With the same 
urgency, reformists looked favourably at protection of women’s and human rights (Farhi, 
2001). The former president Mohammad Khatami identified in the obscurantist interpretation 
of Islam—which has been dominant in Iran for century, he argues—the origin of despotism 
(estebdad). Despotism and repression are inherent characteristics of Iranian society, nurtured 
by centuries of cultural deprivation and religious bigotry. Khatami proposed that reformism 
can break this lineage of authoritarianism because it expresses the revolution’s democratic 
principles (Tazmini, 2009). 
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The reception of liberal or reformist Islam in Iran has been successful. Not only did the 
reformist front enjoyed several electoral victories (including Khatami’s double election as 
president of the Republic on an electoral platform emphasising cultural openness and 
democratic sovereignty), but the impact of reformism is long-lasting and still informs the 
political preferences of Iranians. The liberal interpretation of Islam, in particular, was crucial 




While anti-liberal Islam has always been present in Iran as an unstructured system of ideas 
voiced by single policy-makers—such as the rahbar Khamenei—and opinion leaders, it 
emerged as an organised force able to capture elected positions in reaction to the eight years 
during which liberal Islam dominated elected institutions and the public discourse through 
Khatami’s governments (1997-2005). Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was a crucial figure of this 
trend, but anti-liberal Islamic interpretations were also proposed by other politicians, 
intellectuals and members of the clergy. Differently from liberal Islam, which was the 
expression of a specific faction and of reformist groups organised in quasi-parties such as the 
IIPF, anti-liberal Islam has remained the ideological reference of a cross-factional regrouping, 
considering the reluctance to expand this trend into a well-structured and cohesive party-like 
organisation. Such a reluctance was also connected to the fact that the proponents of anti-liberal 
interpretations of Islam were predominantly members of the Islamic right, which has 
historically displayed anti-party hostility.  
Anti-liberal interpretations were not only constructed in opposition to positive attitudes 
towards issues such as human rights and personal freedoms, but they also built upon the anti-
liberal legacy of the revolutionary ideology—which was an integral, albeit not exclusive, part 
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of Iran’s revolutionary thought. For instance, Ahmadinejad utilised the phrase gharbzadeghi, 
or ‘Westoxification’—a term popularised by the revolutionary literature in the 1960s and 
1970s—to identify a positive predisposition towards liberal notions such as personal rights. 
Instead, he proposed that an Islam constitutes the sole ideological framework in which all 
political and ethical evaluations must be conducted (Randjbar-Daemi, 2018, p. 180). This 
resonates with ideas proposed by the rahbar Khamenei, who during a speech in 2011, declared 
that Islam is the sum of all ideologies, so that there is no need for other political and moral 
references.5 The emphasis on cultural and religious authenticity has an explicit anti-Western 
and anti-imperialist coloration.  
Part of anti-liberal Islam narratives do not only stand in opposition to reformism, but also to 
clerically-induced social conservatism. Ahmadinejad’s anti-liberal Islam, in addition, was 
imaginative and focused upon slogans such as the promise to bring about an Islamic Japan 
(Randjbar-Daemi, 2018, p. 181). Such exaggerated comments did not only have the function 
of attracting visibility. They also suggested that anti-liberal Islam had a propulsive, creative 
force of its own. Another articulation of this vivacity is the attempt at creating an authentic 
Islamic knowledge. During an interview, Hassan Abbasi—a far-right intellectual, war veteran, 
and head of the Center for Doctrinal Analysis, an independent political strategic think-tank—
lamented that current university curricula are moulded on a Western and liberal model of 
science. He asked:  
 
we know that concepts such as hoquq (rights), haqq (right), haqiqat (truth) have 
roots in the Qur’an and other religious sources. But where the roots of “rights” [in 
English in the original] and “truth” [in English] are? Not really in any religious 
                                                        
5 Available at: http://www.lenziran.com/2011/10/khamenei-islamic-republic-is-democracy-freedomsocialism-in-
its-own-terms 
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source… and though, these are the English translation for haqq and hoquq. We 
translate hoquq-e bashar with human rights. Do you see the distance between our 
hoquq-e bashar and “human rights” [in English]? […] Psychology is translated 
with ravanshenasi, but it is not ravanshenasi, we should use “espiritoloji” or 
something alike […] This is why the 90 per cent of the sciences that are taught in 
universities are wrong! How do you reconcile “law” with hoquq? […] This is the 
problem: our though is still secular, because we are merged in secular science and 
we only use Western secular sciences as a model.6 
 
The kind of Islam that is proposed by adherents to this interpretation offers an all-encompassing 
vision of the world and politics, understandable through religion. No cross-cultural 
contamination is needed: rather, it is considered dangerous as potentially leading to the loss of 
identity. Such positions have inspired policies that are suspicious of diplomatic engagement 
with the international community, and have also translated into authoritarian stances towards 
political diversity. 
The notion of justice is fundamental in the construction of an Islamic society. In contrast to the 
typically liberal celebration of private entrepreneurship, anti-liberal Islam has prioritised social 
justice over private profit. This has often translated into a discourse critical of ‘the powerful’ 
in society and in support of ‘the dispossessed’. A champion of such rhetoric was Ahmadinejad, 
who pushed his discourse to the point of criticising the reformist clergy for appropriating 
resources and power by brutalising Khomeini’s legacy—although he promoted economic 
policies privatising state assets (Ehsani, 2009).  
The presence of anti-liberal Islam in Iran has been constant throughout the course of the 
revolution, although its electoral fortune has swung between success and defeat. Hybrid and 
                                                        
6 Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e0kEoIeS4Vc 
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moderate forms of anti-liberal Islam are however present in society, and enjoy both circulation 
and publicity through cultural artefacts that celebrate Islam’s central oppositional role in the 





This chapter has argued that, while there are no official political parties in Iran and religion is 
an obligatory frame of reference, different versions of Islam inform divergent ideological 
preferences. It follows that Islam is an important factor in structuring the way in which political 
orientations coalesce into more or less organised groups.  
The relationship between Islam and political organisations is however complex. A number of 
other factors must be considered, ranging from the presence of associations that enhance 
factionalism, to the resources that the Iranian ‘political marketplace’ can utilise for ideological 
renewal. Overall, environmental conditions constrain the establishment of organised political 
groups as discussed in the chapter. Potential new political strands must, in fact, integrate in the 
pre-exiting ideological framework and this may be sustainable only for so long. In Iran, in fact, 
while the right to dissent is rhetorically celebrated, the right to start an organisation to voice 
such a dissent is very often denied.  
In conclusion, the chapter sought to present a balanced analysis of how ideology interacts with 
material conditions when it comes to the establishment and the functioning of political 
organisations—that is, factions and parties—in Iran. While Islam is not simply a cover for the 
material interests that govern political differentiation and conflicts, attention also needs to be 
given to the role played by the logic of economic gains, the law, and the dominant political 
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